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9States, and we think is important to the effective functioning of the
Economic Development Act.
That, just briefly, says that ‘‘nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to create any inference with respect to the validity or inva-
lidity under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution of any
tax incentive described in this section.’’
Briefly put, what that says is, if an incentive is found to run
afoul of one of the restrictions in section 3A, it is not, per se, in-
valid. Instead, there would need to be a separate determination by
the Court, whoever is considering it, that it rose to the levels of im-
permissible discrimination under the Commerce Clause. We think
this is important in preserving the situation as it existed prior to
Cuno, and does in fact do a lot to alleviate some of the uncertainty.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator THOMAS. Thank you, sir. Appreciate it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duncan appears in the appen-
dix.]
Senator THOMAS. Mr. Hellerstein?
STATEMENT OF WALTER HELLERSTEIN, FRANCIS SHACKEL-
FORD DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF TAXATION LAW, UNI-
VERSITY OF GEORGIA SCHOOL OF LAW, ATHENS, GA
Mr. HELLERSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
honored by the invitation to testify before you today. My testimony
can be summarized in two sentences.
Senator THOMAS. Good for you!
Mr. HELLERSTEIN. First, Congress should draw a line between
acceptable economic development incentives and unacceptable
State tax discrimination. Second, in doing so, Congress should act
very, very carefully.
Why should it draw a line? It should draw a line because the law
in this area is, as the Supreme Court itself has said, a quagmire
and, as I have said somewhat less charitably, a mess.
While the Court has said, as Professor Enrich suggests, that dis-
crimination is one of the basic principles, what is discrimination?
The Cuno case is a poster child for this problem.
The Court held that, on the one hand, an investment tax credit
to attract business to the State is unconstitutional, but a property
tax exemption to attract business to the State is constitutional.
How can that be? Well, I must confess, I wrote a Law Review arti-
cle drawing just that distinction, which the Court relied on.
But Professor Enrich, in his Law Review article, thinks all this
stuff is unconstitutional. Other people who have written Law Re-
view articles say that none of it is unconstitutional. The point of
the matter is, there is no agreement as to what discrimination
means. The Cuno case, I think, demonstrates that.
There is, as Senator Voinovich has suggested, litigation all over
this country, and as Mr. Duncan has suggested, tax incentives all
over the country. It is anybody’s guess as to whether or not these
will or will not survive constitutional scrutiny.
The uncertainty created by this, which has been alluded to by
Senator Voinovich, is very serious, both, from a taxpayer stand-
point, in terms of what they have relied on in the past and what
they may rely on in the future.
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In terms of States, if States lose these cases, under Supreme
Court doctrine they have to provide meaningful backward-looking
relief. That could mean coughing up hundreds and millions of dol-
lars to those who were discriminated against. In the future, budg-
etary considerations are quite uncertain.
The answer to this is not going to come from the courts. Supreme
Court Justice Frankfurter said, ‘‘At best, the Court can only act
negatively. It can determine whether a specific State tax is im-
posed in violation of the Commerce Clause.
‘‘We cannot make a detailed inquiry into the incidence of diverse
economic burdens in order to determine the extent to which such
burdens conflict with the necessities of national economic life. The
problem calls for a solution by devising a Congressional policy.’’
In short, the problem raised by Cuno is much broader than Cuno
itself. Unless Congress acts, I think we will remain in the ‘‘mess
that we are in.’’
How should Congress draw the line? Here, I think the message
is—and in this sense I agree with much of what Professor Enrich
said—very, very carefully. One person’s economic development in-
centive is another person’s discriminatory tax. When New York
tried to lure business to the New York Stock Exchange, that was
an economic incentive to New York. That was a discriminatory tax
to the Boston Stock Exchange.
When Hawaii decided to develop its fledgling pineapple wine in-
dustry, that was just an economic development incentive to Hawaii.
That was a discriminatory tax to those selling liquor from out of
State, and the Court struck it down. The Court struck down the
New York case.
Again, New York wanted to induce export shipment from the
State in the Westinghouse case. Westinghouse said that was a dis-
criminatory tax, even though to others that was an incentive. So
the line between these is very thin, and I think Congress must act
with extraordinary care in doing this.
Just one recent example: Missouri. Two weeks ago today, the
Missouri legislature, by a vote of 152 to 1, did something that
makes a lot of sense. They said, look, we want people to buy cars
that are manufactured in Missouri, so we will just exempt them
from Missouri sales and use tax. Well, that is fine.
But suppose the car is manufactured in Illinois or in Michigan?
It does not take a Nobel Prize-winning economist to realize that
that may be an incentive that Congress would rather not bless. So
my point here is, simply, you must act with extraordinary care in
drawing this line, although I think it is terribly important, for the
reasons I have suggested, to draw that line.
In an attachment to this testimony, with which I will not burden
this hearing, I have suggested a number of technical suggestions
that I think address a number of the problems that Professor En-
rich was referring to.
I think the Voinovich bill makes an excellent start at this proc-
ess, but I do think that it needs some additional fine tuning in
order to make sure that Congress is not throwing out the baby
with the bath water.
Thank you very much.
Senator THOMAS. Thank you, sir.
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:52 Nov 30, 2006 Jkt 095484 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 30836.000 SFIN1 PsN: SFIN1
15
Yet, these countries have much lower operating costs to begin
with. Looking at the economic growth these countries have
achieved over the last decade, it is difficult not to surmise that
their policies to encourage new jobs and investment in their coun-
tries have been effective.
The United States is the greatest country in the world and has
the most robust and productive economy the world has ever known.
These benefits stem from the belief in the power of competition,
and free markets to reward innovation and risk-taking.
Competition makes us all better and more focused on achieving
positive results. Federal legislation which would impede the ability
of States to control their economic destiny, in the face of increas-
ingly intense global competition, would be short-sighted and detri-
mental to the American worker, American investors, and American
institutions.
In the best tradition of States’ rights, this is an area where the
State political process should be used to weigh the pros and cons
of any individual tax credit or incentives policy.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Renzas appears in the appendix.]
Senator THOMAS. Thank you. That is a very impressive panel.
We thank you so much.
We will ask some fairly short questions. I hope you can give us
some fairly short answers. We are kind of pushed. We are going to
start voting at 10:30, I believe, and maybe go on through the day.
It does not sound good.
Dr. Fisher, you have made the case that there is evidence sug-
gesting State tax incentives are not effective. Assuming for a mo-
ment you are correct, how does it make them unconstitutional, and
how can you tell States they are not permitted to offer them with-
out infringing on their taxing jurisdiction?
Dr. FISHER. Well, I think you started out with an economic ques-
tion and ended with a legal one. Maybe I would have to defer the
latter part of that to another member of the panel.
But I would simply say that any legislation is designed to clarify
the issues in this area. I would recommend that it be drawn in a
way that is restrictive of the States and actually reduces the use
of this particular kind of weapon in the economic war among the
States.
Senator THOMAS. So you maintain it is ineffective.
Dr. FISHER. I maintain that they are largely ineffective. Not com-
pletely ineffective.
Senator THOMAS. I understand.
Dr. FISHER. And very expensive.
Senator THOMAS. Professor Enrich, you have argued incentives
are not material to the taxpayers’ investment decisions. I am curi-
ous whether you have return-on-investment information on invest-
ments made with the help of those incentives versus those without
the benefits.
Professor ENRICH. Senator, again, you are asking the legal expert
the economic question. In the course of my scholarship and in the
course of my work as a State official, I have had the occasion to
look at a lot of evidence about the size of differences the tax incen-
tives do make to business bottom lines.
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I do not hold myself out as an economist or an expert, but the
overwhelming evidence is that tax incentives offered at the State
level are not terribly effective.
When I was general counsel to Massachusetts’ Executive Office
for Administration and Finance, I had the opportunity to oversee
a task force that was putting together a document that was dis-
cussing how Massachusetts had effected economic growth. We
found a lot of ways that it had. We ended up deleting the entire
chapter we were planning to write about the efficacy of tax incen-
tives because the evidence simply did not bear it out.
Senator THOMAS. Would you not imagine that if that were true,
the State tax people would not use it?
Professor ENRICH. The political pressures on State political policy
makers to adopt tax incentives, especially when other States are
adopting them, are intense.
Senator THOMAS. All right.
Professor ENRICH. And I think the whole reason that the Com-
merce Clause steps into these areas, is to protect States from that
inevitable competition.
Senator THOMAS. Thank you.
Mr. Hellerstein, if the Court dismisses or overturns the Sixth
Circuit decision, should Congress act to allow State and local incen-
tives?
Mr. HELLERSTEIN. Yes, for the reasons I have suggested. The law
will remain indeterminate. All the Court will do is decide this case,
about this one particular incentive. It will leave open for debate
and certainty all of the incentives all over the country.
Senator THOMAS. All right. Thank you.
Senator Bingaman?
Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you all for your testimony.
It strikes me, what we are talking about here are several dif-
ferent things. First, there is the legal question that is posed by the
Cuno decision, and whether or not there is a legal prohibition
against States and localities providing these types of tax incentives.
Then there is the larger policy question about whether it is good
policy.
As regards the second of those questions, policy, it strikes me,
there are two different competitions that we are talking about. One
is the competition among States and among communities. The
other, of course, is the competition that our entire country faces
relative to the rest of the world.
Now, I do think, myself, I have seen examples in my State where
companies were solicited to move to Ireland, or to Singapore, or
whatever, and there are very substantial financial incentives of-
fered to them to do that.
We have then, for example, the Albuquerque Economic Develop-
ment Organization trying to figure out, how can it compete with
the government of Ireland or the government of Singapore, or
wherever it happens to be. Frankly, it is not a very fair competi-
tion.
It strikes me that this really, as a matter of policy, ought to be
done at the Federal level. I mean, if, in fact, we are going to pro-
vide some kind of response to the very substantial tax incentives
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provided by other countries, we should be doing that at the Federal
level.
Our Department of Commerce or someone in the Federal Govern-
ment ought to be empowered to counter those kinds of offers or
deal with it in some way. If we do not do that, if we are not willing
to do that or smart enough to do that, which has been the case so
far, it strikes me as problematic to say that States and localities
are also prohibited from competing to keep those jobs. I mean, I do
not know how effective their competition is through tax incentives,
but I would hesitate to pass a law saying you are prohibited from
doing anything.
Not only will we not do it at the Federal level, we will not do
anything at the Federal level to keep Ireland from wooing more
and more of our manufacturing to Ireland, but we will not allow
States to do it either, and we will not allow communities to do it
either. So, that is sort of the circumstance I find myself in. I do not
know exactly what question to pose to any of you.
I guess one obvious question is, if we are in fact going to restrict
States and localities from doing some of these things by statute, as
Senator Voinovich has recommended, should we not take on some
responsibility at the Federal level to at least respond in this com-
petition we have with foreign governments? Professor Enrich?
Professor ENRICH. I think you are entirely correct, that there is
an important role for the Federal Government to play in this area.
It may even be an important role for the Federal Government to
identify specific ways in which States can use their tax systems to
further the Federal effort at competing internationally. That is not
what is happening now.
What is happening now is the States are predominantly com-
peting among themselves. It is a grossly inefficient way to compete
internationally, and it is having the consequence of really hurting
us in international competitiveness.
I know I was out in New Mexico talking to tax practitioners
there last week. The problem they are seeing is, because of the tax
breaks that New Mexico is having to give to compete with other
States, they are losing the funding they need to support a strong
educational system and strong infrastructure, which would en-
hance international competitiveness.
Senator BINGAMAN. Do any of the others have comments on that
issue? Nobody?
Dr. FISHER. I would.
Senator BINGAMAN. Go ahead, please.
Dr. FISHER. I would agree with what Peter Enrich just said. I
would point out that there are lots of ways of competing. Labor
costs, for example, are about 14 times the average State and local
tax cost.
Efforts to enhance labor productivity are probably, therefore,
much more important than to make a small change—even a large
change—in the State and local tax bill, which is not going to be
able to offset much of a difference in labor costs. It would simply
be swamped by differences in labor costs. I think the question is
not whether they can occasionally be effective.
The question is, what is the most cost-effective use of limited re-
sources? I would argue that investments in education, particularly
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at this juncture, are a much more cost-effective use of our scarce
resources than competing with one another on the taxes.
Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator THOMAS. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Duncan, do you think the Court’s decision in this case, re-
gardless of whether they uphold the law, will provide sufficient
clarity regarding what is permitted and what is not?
Mr. DUNCAN. I think it is always problematic to project what the
Court might do. They most likely will take the narrowest approach
that they can to try to deal with it in the fashion that they want.
So it is not going to clarify the field and make everything crystal
clear.
But they will certainly have an opportunity to speak to where a
lot of legal commentators believe Cuno went—which was much far-
ther than other courts have gone—in trying to differentiate be-
tween efforts to benefit in-State as opposed to penalizing out-of-
State businesses.
So I think they will probably be narrow and not clarify every-
thing, but they can probably take away a fair amount of uncer-
tainty over the sort of plain old vanilla investment tax credits as
well.
Senator THOMAS. Thank you.
Professor Enrich, is there precedent for Congress overturning a
Court ruling involving this type of Commerce Clause issue?
Professor ENRICH. Senator, there is no question that Congress
has the ultimate authority in areas affected by the Commerce
Clause. The challenge is to use that power wisely, and I trust the
Senate will struggle with that.
Senator THOMAS. Wisely? All right. So there is an opportunity to
do that, to come in and fill the holes that might be left by the deci-
sion.
Professor ENRICH. Not just to fill the holes.
Senator THOMAS. Even if overturned.
Professor ENRICH. It is a grant of authority to Congress. The
courts have played the role of stepping in where Congress has not
acted. Congress certainly has the power, and in previous instances
has exercised that power, to supersede decisions that the courts
have made.
Senator THOMAS. Mr. Hellerstein, do you want to comment on
that?
Mr. HELLERSTEIN. Well, again, clearly Congress has the power.
There is historical precedent for Congress reacting to Supreme
Court precedents, indeed, a precedent which allowed the States to
tax. Congress turned around and said the States could not.
I just want to return for a moment, without keeping you from
your vote, to what Senator Bingaman was suggesting. I think it is
very important to keep in mind that there are two issues here.
The one that Senator Bingaman spoke about as a bigger prob-
lem, which I think is not within my area of expertise, is terribly
important, but we should not let the problems with that issue, I
think, stop Congress from resolving the sort of narrow or legal
problem of clearing up this uncertainty. Even assuming we can
keep the law as it is, at least let us make it clearer. That is my
plea to you.
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Senator THOMAS. Thank you.
Mr. Renzas, what ramifications, if any, do State laws like the one
at issue here have on the international trade arena, in your judg-
ment?
Mr. RENZAS. Well, obviously the ability of States to provide in-
centives currently, as they are doing right now, gives them an op-
portunity to compete against some of these countries that are offer-
ing very lucrative incentives for American manufacturing jobs, and
other types of jobs. We have one right now, for example, a $500
million investment, high technology, that is looking at Canada and
the United States. It is down to the point where there are two fi-
nalist locations, one in the United States and one in Canada. It is
a German company.
They stated, if this location in the United States is not able to
provide enough incentives, they will go to Canada. That will be
high-technology jobs in a very lucrative industry that will be mov-
ing to another country as a result of this.
So, yes, it is very important. To the extent that you can give
States—or the U.S. Government can provide those kinds of incen-
tives to stem the tide of those jobs elsewhere, it is a very, very im-
portant issue.
Senator THOMAS. It gets to be a little sticky as to whether that
is done to compete with Canada or to compete with Colorado, is it
not?
Mr. RENZAS. That is going to be the issue that Congress is going
to have to deal with.
Senator THOMAS. Mr. Duncan, or whoever, how many States
offer investment tax credits similar to the one in question in the
Cuno case, do you know?
Mr. DUNCAN. I do not have an exact number, but I think you can
guarantee yourself it is at least 35.
Senator THOMAS. Is that right, around that? Are there States or
localities who publicly sided with the plaintiffs against the tax in-
centive, and, if so, what is the division among the States, Mr.
Renzas? Do you know?
Mr. RENZAS. I do not know which States have sided against the
tax incentives. I am not aware of that. Most States are reluctant
to take that position because it is really going to hurt their eco-
nomic development competitiveness right now.
Senator THOMAS. Mr. Duncan, do you have a thought on that?
Mr. DUNCAN. I would turn to the counsel in the case.
Senator THOMAS. All right.
Professor ENRICH. There was an amicus brief on behalf of the
State of Ohio that was signed by 34 States, almost to all States,
who did have similar issues that they were appropriately seeking
to defend.
Senator THOMAS. I see. All right. Thank you.
Senator?
Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask, Dr. Fisher, based on your anal-
ysis of the economics, if you were to assume that tax incentives can
impact on the decision to locate a plant or to maintain an oper-
ation, to some extent, to what extent does the possibility of Federal
tax incentives compare to the possibility of State and local tax in-
centives?
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My impression is, and I think one of you testified to the effect
that, there is a substantially greater capability at the Federal level
to provide financial incentives through the tax code than there is
at the State and local levels, so you have State and local govern-
ments essentially giving away the fairly modest taxing authority
that they have to get these jobs to locate there, where the Federal
Government could do much more if it were so inclined. Do you have
any thoughts on that?
Dr. FISHER. I think, if you take the corporate income tax, I think
the Federal is, on average, probably about six times the State. The
top Federal rate is still 35 percent and the average State rate, I
think, is around 6 percent. So, clearly, there is a great deal more
leverage internationally with adoption of incentives as part of the
Federal tax than State and corporate income tax.
Senator BINGAMAN. All right. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Senator THOMAS. I cannot help but think, as you talk, that this
is sort of a challenge to the Federal Government, to make their
taxes competitive with the rest of the world if we are going to have
people come to this country.
Gentlemen, thank you so very much. I think this is a most inter-
esting issue, certainly one in which both the courts and the Con-
gress is involved. You have brought us some very important issues
and information, and we thank you so much for it. Some might
have some further questions for you in the next 24 hours, and I
hope you will respond to them. Thank you.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:29 a.m., the hearing was concluded.]
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